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This paper studies optimal investment policies when the production func-
tion depends on capital of various vintages. In such an environment it is natural
to ask whether the ﬁrm will invest in old-vintage capital at all. In this paper
I derive such a condition. Predictably, investment in old capital takes place
if the elasticity of substitution between old and new capital is low, and when
the depreciation of capital is high. But other parameters such as the rates of
technological progress and depreciation matter as well.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a production function that has capital stocks of various vintages
as its arguments. Diﬀerent vintages of capital participate and interact in the same
production process for output. The paper seeks to characterize the direction of in-
vestment — should that investment be in new vintages, old vintages, or both?
A second class of papers emphasizes a technological speciﬁcity of capital and
each capital type may have diﬀerent vintages created. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991)
introduce the concept of diﬀerent technologies within which there are vintages of
technology-speciﬁc human capital, and then they analyze a special case in which
output depends on the employment of old capital and new capital speciﬁct ot h a t
technology. Boldrin and Levine (2001, 2002) and Boldrin and Fernandez-Villaverde
(2005) also fall in this class, except that some of their models are quality-ladder
models rather than vintage models and some allow for ﬁx e df a c t o r sw h i c hn e i t h e r
Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) nor I model explicitly. Yet another technology-choice
model is Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996). All these papers relate to mine because
they ask a question similar to the one I ask here, namely, when does an economy
∗I thank Jess Benhabib, Michele Boldrin, Bart Hobijn, Hyeok Jeong, Matthias Kredler, Omar
Licandro, Dmitriy Stolyarov, Gianluca Violante, and especially Jeremy Greenwood for comments
and the NSF and the Marion Ewing Kauﬀman Foundation for support.
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1switch to a technology of a new vintage, i.e., how long do agents keep investing in
old technologies after a new technology becomes available. Therefore this literature
asks the question literature asks the question whether agents should use the new
technology, old technologies, or both?
The question of old versus new comes up in a non-trivial way even in the traditional
one-capital model. The traditional one-capital production function has capital of
diﬀerent vintages aggregated by the perpetual inventory method; the elasticity of
substitution between the diﬀerent vintages of capital is inﬁnite.1 Nevertheless, in
this model a suﬃcient price decline for the old capital can induce agents to buy used
capital and then agents face the decision — do I buy new capital, old capital, or both?
A related literature exists dealing with substitution in tastes as opposed to pro-
duction. Koeniger and Licandro (2006) ﬁnd that as the elasticity of substitution in
utility rises, resources shift towards the most productive sectors. This is similar to my
ﬁnding that a higher elasticity of substitution in production shifts the distribution of
capital in use towards the most productive, i.e., towards the latest vintages.
There are, however, plenty of examples where old and new capital are not perfect
substitutes and where they may instead complement one another to an extent. New
machinery is usually housed in an older building, and therefore work such as Gort,
Greenwood and Rupert (1999) that diﬀerentiates structures from equipment implic-
itly also deals with a production function that includes capital of diﬀerent vintages
between which the elasticity of substitution is ﬁnite. Other examples are the ren-
ovation of an old structure with a new HVAC system, putting new software on an
old computer, and retro-ﬁtting a new restaurants. And the same vintage of the ‘VW
Beetle’ was produced in Mexico from 1964 to 2003.
This paper seeks to answer the question of how investment in new vintages vs.
old vintages depends on the elasticity of substitution in production and on other
parameters. It assumes that the production function is CES in the capital stocks of
diﬀerent vintages. We ﬁnd, not at all surprisingly, that when the elasticity is high
enough, ﬁrms will not invest in old-vintage capital, but only in new capital. But when
the elasticity drops to a critical level, ﬁrms will wish to invest in old capital. We shall
derive this critical level under the assumption that the interest rate is constant.
Neither Benhabib and Rustichini (1991, 1992) nor Chari and Hopenhayn (1991)
derive such a condition in their models. Just as I do here, Chari and Hopenhayn
(1991) analyzed only a steady state, and the same forces are at work in their model
as operate here. The condition we shall derive, (11), involves four parameters, and
each operates in an intuitive way. Let us refer to Figure 1. It turns out that investment
in old capital is more likely if
1. The elasticity of substitution, σ, between old and new capital is low — this
makes old capital more essential to production. This was already suggested by
the simulation results displayed in Figure 1 of Chari and Hopenhayn;
1See Section 5 for a treatment of models in this class.
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Figure 1: Illustration of condition (11)
2. Depreciation of capital, δ, is high — this makes old capital wear away faster and
replacement of that capital is more likely to be needed;
3. Technological progress, γ, is low — this means that new capital has little produc-
tive advantage over old capital — this too was suggested by Chari and Hopen-
hayn;
4. Returns to scale, α, are high — this raises the ﬁrm’s growth rate in response to
a given rate of technological progress, which then brings in more capital, young
and old alike.
Having derived the parameters under which the ﬁrm never wishes to invest in
old technology, we shall then ask if realistic parameters lie in that set or not. We
do know that in fact, investment in old capital occurs all the time, whether it is
the renovation of old buildings or the production of new plant and equipment under
an old design. From human-capital-based estimates of σ ≈ 0.5, and α of anywhere
upwards of 0.2, we conclude that σ is comfortably inside the South-East region of
Figure 1. We also know that implication #3, at least, is resoundingly conﬁrmed by
the historical time series: During the pre-industrial revolution era when growth was
low, technologies took a long time to spread; that is, agents would for a long time
3invest in old technologies. Boddy and Gort (1971) discuss the substitution of old
capital for new capital with special reference to structures which are older than the
equipment that they house.
A closely related paper is that of Aruga (2007) who asks the same question —
when does a ﬁrm invest in capital of older vintages — though in a very diﬀerent model.
Aruga shows that when each vintage production function requires two complementary
capital stocks that depreciate at diﬀerent rates, investment in old capital is optimal
when it allows to eﬃciently utilize the undepreciated stock of complementary capital
(like writing new software for old computers instead of throwing the old computers
out).2 Since I assume that all capital depreciates at the same rate, Aruga’s results
and mine are complements.
We shall begin at the partial equilibrium level, since we are interested in describing
a ﬁrm’s production function and a ﬁrm’s optimal investment behavior. In section 2
we shall deal with the decision problems of ﬁrms that take the rate of interest, r as
exogenously given. We shall close the model in Section 3 and derive the equilibrium
interest rate. Section 4 oﬀers some conjectures on investment policies that would
be optimal when the growth rate is not constant. Section 5 deals independently
with what otherwise is a special case that arises when the elasticity of substitution is
inﬁnite — the eﬃciency-units approach of Jorgenson (1964) and Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Krusell (1997) — and shows that the two approaches lead to the same investment
policy and growth rate. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l
A ﬁrm’s or an economy’s output depends on the sequence of capital stocks (kv,t)
v=t
v=−∞
and possibly other factors. Here kv,t is the amount of capital of vintage v at date t.











0 <α<10 <β<1. (2)
All capital depreciates at the constant rate δ. There is no technology for converting
one vintage of capital into another3, and capital cannot be consumed. Therefore the
scrap value of capital is zero.
2Aruga’s Proposition 1(i) states that if embodied technological progress is suﬃciently slow when
compared to the diﬀerential in the depreciation rates of the two types of capital, then investment in
old-vintage capital will be optimal.
3See Boldrin and Fernandez-Villaverde (2005) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (forthcoming) for
models that allow for such a conversion technology. Comin and Hobijn (2006) allow full reversibility
of investment — selling the machine allows the recovery of the full cost of making it.





Note that we assumed that β>0 which means that σ exceeds unity.
The case of β<0.–In the Cobb-Douglas case in which β =0and σ =1 ,t h e
ﬁrm will have to invest in old capital if it is to produce output as t gets large. It
follows, then, that the same will be true when β<0, i.e., when σ<1,n e wa n do l d
capital are more complementary than Cobb Douglas. Therefore the relevant β values
for which the ﬁrm will not invest in old capital will in any case have to be positive,
and so the restriction in (2) does not limit the analysis in any way.4 That is why (10)
is also valid for all β ≤ 0, and (11) is valid for 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
The accumulation of capital of diﬀerent vintages.–In general ﬁrms will invest in
old-vintage capital. We seek conditions under which this is true. To derive these
conditions we proceed as follows:
1. Assume all investment is in new capital
2. Derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for this investment pattern to be
optimal along a constant-growth path.
This procedure makes the analysis simple, but limits the results to constant
growth.
Since all investment is, by assumption, always in frontier capital, we do not need







Technological progress.–We assume that the eﬃciency of date t investment is zt.
We assume throughout that the price of capital is unity, that the unit investment
delivers zt eﬃciency units of capital.
4The Chari-Hopenhayn speciﬁcation implies that if the elasticity of substitution is one or less,
the wage paid to the young generation is zero — see their equation (5) and the sentence below.
52.1 The ﬁrm’s problem
Consider the problem of a ﬁrm that (for now) is not allowed to invest in past vintages



















subject to the initial condition that the distribution of capital over past vintages
(t ≤ 0) at date zero is given. Since there are no adjustment costs, the FOC says that



















































Procedure.–We make the constant-growth assumptions for zt = eγt.W eu s et h e
method of undetermined coeﬃcients. i.e., assume that
xt = x0e
λt


















The faster the investment technology and investment grow, the higher the growth
rate. At t =0and for ﬁxed x0, the level is decreasing in δ (stuﬀ depreciates away),
6in γ (high γ means lower investment technology levels for t<0 since we ﬁxed it to
1a tt =0 ) and also decreasing in λ (the logic is just like for γ).
Now we substitute the solution for output back into the FOC for investment (the
second equation) — the ﬁrst states our undetermined coeﬃcients again, taken to the

















































We need A>0 for this to be ﬁnite, which it is whenever α<β , i.e., whenever
decreasing returns are suﬃciently small to override complementarity in the vintages.





Proof. Growth of x. – T h eu n d e t e r m i n e dg r o w t hr a t e ,λ,o fx then satisﬁes
(1 − β)λ = βγ + r + βδ − A = βγ +( α − β)(γ + λ)
= α(γ + λ) − βλ










(αγ +[ 1− α]γ)
w h i c ha g a i nl e a d st o( 7 ) .
Surprisingly, perhaps, growth does not depend on β,and is the same as the growth
rate we derived in (18) as it should be. Otherwise the expression is intuitive: The
faster z grows, the faster the ﬁrm invests, and the weaker are the decreasing returns
in production, (i.e. the closer α is to 1), the faster investment grows.
Level of x and y.–Now, substitute into the constants Cy and A to get

















































r + δ + γ
, (9)
and this is the same expression as we got in (19), as it should be.
2.2 When does the ﬁrm invest in old-vintage capital?
So far we assumed that the ﬁrm had to invest in frontier technology only. Is this a
binding constraint? We know that it does not bind when the k’s are perfect substi-
tutes up to a change of units, i.e., when β =1which implies that the elasticity of
substitution σ = 1
1−β =+ ∞. It turns out that there is a range of values of β for
which the ﬁrm would not invest in past technologies.
Proposition 2 The ﬁrm invests in old technologies if and only if the elasticity of
substitution of the capital inputs is suﬃciently low; that is, if and only if
β<
γα+ δ(1 − α)
γ + δ(1 − α)
. (10)
Proof. The FOC (6) is met at date t.T h e ﬁrm will not wish to invest in date-t














The term eγt does not change over time because the eﬃciency of creating the type-t
capital does not change. If the ﬁrm does not ever again invest in technology t, xt
shrinks at the rate δ. On the other hand, y grows at the rate αλ = α
1−αγ.T h ei n t e g r a l










which is negative if and only if (10) holds.
The RHS of (10) is less than one whenever α<1, and therefore there is a neigh-
borhood around 1 for β for which the ﬁrm invests only in the newest vintage. Also,
the RHS of (10) is increasing in α, making the condition harder to satisfy at higher
values of α.5





where λ is the growth rate of output. The RHS is increasing in α,λ,a n dδ.
82.2.1 Re-stating (10) in terms of the elasticity of substitution
A simpler condition emerges when we state (10) in terms of the elasticity of substi-
tution in production, σ = 1
1−β.S i n c eβ =1− 1




γα+ δ(1 − α)
γ + δ(1 − α)
=
γ (1 − α)
γ + δ(1 − α)
.








This is our main result, and we discussed its plausibility in the introduction; a few
more remarks here:
• Ah i g hγ discourages investment in old capital by making new capital more
attractive. As γ t e n d st oz e r o ,t h ev i n t a g e sb e c o m ee x c h a n g e a b l ei nt h ep r o -
duction function and investment in old capital must take place as long as there’s
any complementarity among the vintages.
• The eﬀect of α appears to work through the growth rate, α
1−αγ. Fixing γ ﬁxes
the advantage of new vintages relative to old vintages. As α rises, the rate of
growth rises and this draws investment in old vintages.
• The elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent vintages of k diﬀers from Chari’s
and Hopenhayn’s concept of substitution between capital of diﬀe r e n ta g e sw i t h i n
the same technological vintage.6 Nevertheless, a lower σ prolongs the period of
investment in old technologies in both their paper and this one.
3 General equilibrium and growth
We found that the growth rate of the ﬁrm’s output does not depend on r and β,b u t
that the level eﬀect on investment, derived in (9) depended on both parameters.
Market organization.–Because of diminishing returns (α<1), we shall assume
an exogenous number of ﬁrms that we shall normalize to a unit mass.
Preferences and saving.–Utility is homothetic and capital markets are perfect.
Then the distribution of income does not aﬀect the total amount saved and consumed.
W et h e r e f o r ei m a g i n ea na g e n tt h a ta td a t ez e r oo w n st h ea v e r a g ew e a l t h ,c a l li tW,
in the economy, and we shall determine conditions for the optimal time path of per
6Also, their paper is about human, not physical capital and has only two capital inputs, “expe-
rienced” and “inexperienced.”
9capita consumption of the ﬁnal good, ct. Capital markets are perfect, with the interest











The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem yield consumption growth equal to (r − ρ)/θ.







whence we get the equilibrium level of r as




Thus β aﬀects neither the rate of growth nor the rate of interest.
4 Possible extensions
Two obvious directions are left unexplored here: Heterogeneity and oﬀ-steady-state
dynamics.
4.0.2 Heterogeneity
The model assumes that ﬁrms are all the same. If investment in old capital does occur,
it is because diﬀerent vintages are complements in the representative ﬁrm’s production
function. We may wish to extend the results to heterogeneous ﬁrms. Paradoxically,
perhaps, when trading of used capital is possible, old capital is less likely to be
produced. The models of used-capital trading by Jovanovic (1998), Stolyarov (2002),
and Licandro, Puch and Sampayo (2006) all involve investment in new capital that, as
it ages, is then passed down from rich to poor customers. But while there is continual
purchase of old capital by some ﬁrms or households, there is never production of
vintage capital — only the latest vintage is produced at each date.
If used-capital markets cannot function well, perhaps because of informational
frictions, then if some agents or ﬁrms have a special need for vintage capital, that
n e e dw o u l dh a v et ob es a t i s ﬁed by new production of vintage capital.
104.0.3 Conjectures on oﬀ-steady-state dynamics
Having gone through the derivations we may conjecture what will happen oﬀ the
constant-growth path. We may seek conditions under which investment in old capital
will happen (i) Sometimes and (ii) Always.
1. Investment in old capital sometimes.–One would expect that investment in old
capital will happen at some dates even under conditions weaker than (10). In
a recession there may be little or no investment. Later, when the recession is
over, capital of the recession-era vintage will be scarce, and ﬁrms will want to
obtain some.
2. Investment in old capital always.–Conditions stronger than (10) would be
needed for this to be true. As Benhabib and Rustichini (1992, p. 2) point
out, a high level of past investments in capital of a given type will reduce the
current level of investment in that type of capital. In a boom there may be
a lot of investment in the capital of a given vintage. When the boom is over,
capital of the boom vintage will be plentiful when compared to younger-vintage
capital, and ﬁrms would not always want to augment it.
Adda and Cooper (2000) analyze transitional dynamics in a model in which only
the latest vintage of capital is produced, and Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) analyze
the case where there is no technological progress but where there are shocks and a
ﬁxed costs of adjusting capital. Kremer and Thomson (1998) study the convergence
properties of a Chari-Hopenhayn type of OLG model and argue that convergence
can take a long time, even for fairly values of the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerent vintages of skill.
5E v i d e n c e o n ( 1 1 )
Choosing reasonable values for the parameters on the RHS of (11).–As α becomes
unity or as γ goes to zero, (11) holds for all σ<∞. Evidence on returns to scale is
that they are thought to be close to constant, and a value α =0 .85 would be about
as low as one could reasonably go. From (7)w es e et h a ti fw es e to u t p u tg r o w t ha t
0.02, we would then need to have γ =0 .004. It also is reasonable to set δ at 0.08. In
that case (11) reads
σ<26.7.
One can entertain other parameters. For instance if, instead of (1) we were to












11In a closed economy with a fully-employed labor force, L would be given, and then it
would be reasonable to interpret α ≈ φα0. In that case, using information on factor
shares and what we know about span of control, we could get α to be as low as 0.2.
Nevertheless, any reasonable set of values for the parameters in (12) would produce
a value for RHS of (11) of at least 5. As we shall see, however, the estimates we have
for σ are an order of magnitude below that, and so clearly the model leads us to the
conclusion that we should see investment in old vintages of capital.
5.1 Evidence on technology adoption
While (11) seems to hold in practice, we would like to know how slack the inequality
is. But there are diﬀerent degrees with which (11) may hold — is there any evidence
that diﬀusion is slower when (10) is more extremely satisﬁed? A second reason why
we should expect (11) to hold is that we observe ﬁrms investing in old technologies
and old capital, and that the penetration of a technology is gradual and S shaped.
If (11) or, equivalently, (10) did not hold, technological diﬀusion would be instan-
taneous: Technology would reach its maximal penetration immediately. After its
immediate introduction capital thereafter would slowly depreciate and asymptote to
zero — contrary to the evidence. A higher γ indicates a speedier technology cycle.
Next, it seems that there exist ideal proportions between old and new vintages
of ships: A telling example concerns steam ships and diesel ships. During World
War II, the Germans lost many more internal-combustion-driven ships than steam
ships. Yet, by 1965 the proportions of motor and steam ships had reverted to the
proportions prevailing in the ﬂeets of the four Scandinavian countries none of which
had had nearly as large a fraction of their ﬂeets destroyed during the war. This is
depicted in Figure 6 of Comin and Hobijn (2004).
5.2 Labor-market evidence
We have some estimates on σ for vintage human capital. Jeong and Kim (2007) esti-
mated the elasticity of substitution between raw labor, L, and a multi-period-based















where the kj are quantities of experience accumulated in vintage j and adjusted for
quality. Without going into the details of how they calculate the kj,s u ﬃce it to say
that the index of vintage human capital is a linear, quality-adjusted weighted average
of past experience levels, and so the parameter β0 in (13) is not quite the same as the
parameter β in (1). Nevertheless β and ˆ β measure should be fairly close to each other.
12In a variety of data sets these authors estimate β0 to be negative, i.e., an elasticity of
substitution below unity. For Thailand the estimated elasticity of substitution was
ˆ σ ≡
1
1 − ˆ β0
=0 .42
for the modern sector and only ˆ σ =0 .08 for the traditional sector. Jeong, Kim
and Manovskii (2007) analyze the U.S. data and they assume only one “modern”
technology for which they give two point estimates. The ﬁrst is identiﬁed from the
time-series variation of the aggregate experience to labor ratio (as in the Jeong-Kim
paper) and the second from the cross section using diﬀerences in the experience to
labor ratio across US states. The ﬁrst gives ˆ σ =0 .46 and the second estimate is
ˆ σ =0 .47. The standard errors are quite low, and so based on these estimates we
would say that the left-hand side of (11) is around 0.5 whereas we concluded above
that the right-hand side is at least 5. Therefore the human-capital-based σ seems to
be well inside the south-east region in Figure 1.
Since experience leads to the accumulation of some kind of skill, the evidence on
the elasticity of substitution of skilled and unskilled labor should also be of relevance.
Katz and Murphy estimate the elasticity of substitution between high-school labor
(their “unskilled” labor) and college labor (their “skilled” labor) and the estimated
value is 1.4. Krusell et al. (2000) estimate the elasticity of substitution between
high-school labor (their “unskilled” labor) and college labor (their “skilled” labor) at
1.7. Though above unity, these estimates still are several times the likely value of the
RHS of (11).
The human capital evidence must be interpreted with caution because older vin-
tages of labor may be more productive due to experience. Physical capital also may
become more productive with age if there is a learning curve associated with its
adoption, as would be the case if equipment needs to be debugged and made user
friendly.
6 A consistency check: The eﬃciency-units ap-
proach
It is instructive to look separately at the standard way of writing the production
function in which capital appears as an aggregate, a sum of depreciated eﬃciency
units created at various dates in the past. Equation (16) below is an example of
what we mean. In this case the elasticity of substitution between capital of diﬀerent
vintages is inﬁnite. We shall solve this case independently, however, and then show
that the answers independently, so that this section can also be seen as a way of
c h e c k i n go u rp r e v i o u sr e s u l t sf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hβ =1 .
Even in this model, however, if old capital falls in price it can trade on the used-
capital market and, if the cost of producing it falls, we will see newly-produced
13old-vintage capital. In other words, whether old capital is used also depends on
its cost relative to new capital. The original version of Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Krusell (1992, 1997) was a vintage capital model that made this point in its Figure
4. The idea is simply that if old capital is cheap enough one will buy it, even when
it substitutes perfectly with new capital. As pointed out in the introduction, even
if old-vintage capital cannot be produced (perhaps the recipe is “forgotten” or the
specialized inputs are no longer available as may be the case with old architecture),
old capital can and does trade on the used capital market at the discount deemed
suﬃcient.7
In this currently popular version of the vintage-capital model, because the elas-
ticity of substitution between the diﬀerent capital stocks is inﬁnite, all investment
is in the latest-vintage capital. This is the approach to vintage capital that Domar
(1963), Jorgenson (1966), and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) take. For
completeness I shall now show that when β =1 , the model is quite consistent with
this approach. Thus in Jorgenson (1966) and Greenwood et al. (1997), e.g., the
argument in the production function is average eﬃciency of capital.
Let output depend on the number of eﬃciency units of capital, K so that




= −δKt + ztxt, (15)






It is seen that if F (K)=Kα, then (14) and (16) are equivalent to (1) when β =1 .
For the production function (14), and for most other purposes, an equivalent way
to proceed would be to assume that all vintages of capital are homogeneous and that
it is just the price, qt ≡ 1/zt, of a unit of capital that declines over time.








7Interpreting the discount at which old capital trades is not so easy. The discount may reﬂect
wear and tear (“depreciation”) which in the one-capital model is interpretable as e−δA,w h e r eA
is the age of the capital but not any change in the price of an eﬃciency unit of capital relative to
the consumption good. Or it may reﬂect a change in the price of the market value of old capital
relative to the consumption good (“obsolescence”), as typically occurs in the vintage-capital model
in which old capital falls in price when a new capital can be produced more cheaply. Hulten and
Wykoﬀ (1981) recognize the distinction in their ﬁrst footnote, but in their concluding paragraph they
admit that they cannot disentangle the two eﬀects. Gort, Greenwood and Rupert (1999) achieve
identiﬁcation in reaching their eq. (2.26) by assuming that structures do not physically depreciate
because they must be perfectly maintained.
14subject to (14), (16) and subject to K0 being given. There are no adjustment costs,







Now let the production function be of the form
F (K)=AK
α.









To solve for the optimal path we guess that K grows at a constant rate, μ,p l u gt h i s














































Now x g r o w sm o r es l o w l yt h a nK.T od e r i v ex we use (15)




































Therefore x grows at the rate
α
1 − α
γ = αμ (18)
which is the same as the expression in (7). Substituting for μ into the previous










r + δ + γ
. (19)
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has analyzed the optimal investment policy of a ﬁrm that faces a CES
production function the inputs of which are capital stocks of diﬀerent vintages. Filling
a gap left by Benhabib and Rustichini (1991, 1992), Chari and Hopenhayn (1991)
and others, the paper states the parameter conﬁguration under which investment in
old vintages actually would take place. This restriction is stated in Proposition 2,
and then re-stated more conveniently in (11).
The restriction is valid only for a deterministic economy that grows at a constant
rate. When the ﬁrm’s investment rate ﬂuctuates, the conditions for ensuring that
investment in old capital occurs sometimes would be weaker, and the conditions
under which it would occur always would be stronger. The economy also has no ﬁxed
factor, and therefore no country or location has a natural advantage in buying new
capital as opposed to old.
A limitation of the result is its qualitative nature. It tells us if investment in old
capital will occur, but it does not say how much. In other words, it tells us when the
distribution of capital by vintage will be non-degenerate, but it does not say anything
about the shape of that distribution. On this dimension it is likely that we shall have
to continue to rely on the computer. Benhabib and Rustichini (1992) and Chari and
Hopenhayn (1991) have already simulated their economies. Condition (11) should be
a useful complement to such simulations.
The paper also have not analyzed the eﬀect of heterogeneity. Finally, technological
progress is throughout assumed to be exogenous. If invention requires the sacriﬁce of
resources, the speed with which new technologies gain market share will in general
aﬀect the rate of technological progress.
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